Managing A Changing Relationship: China's Japan Policy in the 1990s by Ross, Robert S.
THE
MIT JAPAN
PROGRAM
Science, Technology,
Management
'7I?
Managing A Changing
China's Japan Policy
Relationship:
in the 1990s
Robert S. Ross
MITJP#96-30
Center for International Studies
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
-
___I___ - - ·- ·l----· 1~~
- ·~IC-I~I*I-
r)
'7 X7-3 (-0; --
16
Managing A Changing Relationship:
China's Japan Policy in the 1990s
Robert S. Ross
MITJP#96-30
Distributed Courtesy of the
MIT Japan Program
Science * Technology * Management
Center for International Studies
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Room E38-7th Floor
Cambridge, MA 02139
phone: 617-253-2839
fax: 617-258-7432
© MIT Japan Program
L _---·LLI---III IIII_1_I__1_1·__.I_ .
This paper was prepared for the conference on
"CHINA INTO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY:
STRATEGIC PARTNER AND...OR PEER COMPETITOR"
Strategic Studies Institute
United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks
April 23-25, 1996
`----- -*·. I arr  I--.- ·--
China's Japan policy is a central component of China's overall security policy, rivaling the
U.S.-China relations in importance. As both an economic and potential military great power,
Japan has the ability to make a significant contribution to Chinese security. It can contribute to
Chinese economic development and become a partner in managing regional security issues in the
interest of stability in East Asia and their respective national interests. Alternatively, over the
longer term, Japan has the ability to become a major threat to vital Chinese interests. Should
Sino-Japanese security relations deteriorate, Tokyo could deny China access to its economic
resources, including the Japanese market, and its capital and technology, and it could influence
other countries in East Asia to do the same. This would have a significant impact on Chinese
economic development and Beijing's long-term military modernization program. Japan could also
participate in a regional coalition aimed at China and, most alarming, if it realized its considerable
offensive military potential, it could directly influence the regional balance of power and regional
diplomacy to China's strategic detriment.
China has a lot at stake in Sino-Japanese relations. To maximize the benefits and minimize
the prospects for adverse trends, Beijing must carefully manage the relationship, seeking to
consolidate cooperative trends, to avoid the develop of unnecessary conflict, and to minimize the
impact of basic conflict of interests. Simultaneously, without undermining its cooperative efforts
toward Japan, Beijing must also develop the domestic resources necessary to contend with an
economically, technologically, and militarily more capable Japan; it has to play catch-up to a
potential great power threat. Finally, Chinese policy makers must pay close attention to
contemporary trends in Japanese foreign and defense policy, including policy toward China,
assessing the impact of changing Japanese policy on Chinese security interests. In response, they
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2must developed a nuanced policy that discourages detrimental trends in Japanese policy while not
undermining the prospects for bilateral cooperation.
The challenges of China's Japan policy are considerable. Even under the best of
circumstances, Chinese leaders would be hard-pressed to develop a Japan policy that could satisfy
these competing demands. Yet contemporary circumstances make the task all the more difficult.
Recent developments in Chinese relations with Taiwan and the United States impact Japanese
foreign policy and domestic politics in Beijing and Tokyo complicate the process of sustaining
nuanced foreign policies and cooperative bilateral relations. It is far from clear that in these
complex circumstances, Chinese policy makers have either the diplomatic skill or the political
flexibility to meet the challenge of sustaining Sino-Japanese cooperation.
JAPAN, MULTIPOLARITY, AND THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY:
Chinese leaders share the global appreciation for the reduced tensions of the post-Cold
War era. As much as any other country, China contributed to the positive outcome of the Cold
War and it welcomes the opportunity to end the high level military readiness and economic
dislocations associated with the Soviet threat and to focus its scarce domestic resources on
economic development.
Nonetheless, Chinese leaders also share in the widespread apprehension that the current
relief from high levels of international tension may be short-lived. They do not believe that power
politics has ended or that there is any guarantee the there will be long-term stability in
international politics or great power relations. As Premier Li Peng explained in his March 1996
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3Report on the Work of the Government to the National People's Congress, "The world...is still
full of contradictions. Hegemonism and power politics are the roots of instability in the world."'
A senior Chinese journalist explained that looking toward the twenty-first century, "all is not well
in the world. Hegemonism and power politics will remain the principle barriers to...peace and
stability."2
A key component of this perspective is the shifting relations among the great power in the
transition to a multipolar balance of power in East Asia. While acknowledging that the United
States is the only superpower, Chinese policy makers understand that uneven rates of change
among the great powers will gradually produce a more equitable regional distribution of power in
the twenty-first century. Once again, Li Peng described well the Chinese perspective, arguing that
"the world is developing toward multipolarization at an accelerating pace."3 A retired senior
Chinese diplomat observed that since the end of the Cold War, "the world has been moving with a
dizzying pace toward multipolarity."4 In this evolving situation, international conflict and
cooperation will be determined by great power relations. "In a multipolar world, the single
superpower and the many powers may cooperate when their interests collide, and clash when their
interests conflict."5 In the twenty-first century, the great powers "will engage in mutual
competition, mutual restraint, and mutual cooperation."6
Central to China's understanding of the East Asian security in the twenty-first century is
its assessment of the Japan's likely future role in the multipolar balance of power. Chinese
perceive Japan as a rising power determined to play a major independent role in the regional
balance. Foreign Minister Qian Qichen observed that Japan "is not reconciled to being only an
economic power but hopes to play a major role as a big power in international affairs."' Chen
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4Peiyao, director of the Shanghai Institute of International Studies, argues that Japan aims to
become the economic and political leader of East Asia and has started to compete actively with
the United States for regional influence.8 Chinese analysts also point to Japan's increasing effort
to become a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council and its growing military
participation in U.S. peacekeeping activities, including its participation in the U.N. intervention in
Cambodia as evidence of its political ambitions.9
Compounding Chinese concern regarding Japanese intentions is its appraisal of Japanese
capabilities. Japanese great power economic capabilities are well known. Japanese business has
become the importance source of new direct foreign investment for the ASEAN countries,
displacing the American role as the primary source of industrial growth for such countries as
Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Japan also makes an important contribution to economic
development and continued growth in Taiwan. Tokyo's regional economic influence can readily
translate into political influence, potentially enabling Japan to influence the foreign policies of
many East Asian countries.
More significant, however, than Japanese economic influence is its potential military
capability. Chinese leaders frequently point out that power in the twenty-first century will
increasingly rest on comprehensive national strength, and that economic and technological
capabilities are central to the development of such power. Yet, the implications of this analysis is
not only that economic capabilities will play an increasing role in great power competition, but
also that technological and economic capabilities will be increasingly important in determining the
strategic balance of power and the outcome military competition. Certainly, the display of U.S.
capabilities during the Gulf War revealed the post-Cold War continued importance both of
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military power and of technology in producing such power. Thus, Ding Henggao, head of
China's Commission on National Defense, Science, Technology and Industry, pointed out that
"The explosive growth of modem technology is having an increasingly profound impact on
military affairs" and that defense science and technology "plays an irreplaceable role in boosting
China's defense capability and comprehensive national strength.""
Chinese leaders are convinced that military capabilities will play a decisive role in great
power relations and that Japan, despite its relationship with the United States and domestic
political and societal restraints on military activism, is well positioned to be a formidable military
great power. Japan's military acquisition program makes clear that Japan "harbors a strong desire
to play a bigger military role in the world."" Although Japan has not developed significant
offensive capabilities, the steady increase in its defense budget since the late 1970s has produced a
modem and formidable defense establishment." Apart from the United States, Japan has more
major warships of than any other Asian country and any European member of NATO. It already
deploys in Asia more submarines, escort ships and mine warfare units that the United States and
after the U.S. Seventh Fleet completes its scheduled downsizing, Japan will have more major
vessels in East Asia that the United States. Moreover, this a new and modem navy, having been
built in the last 15 years. Almost all of Japan's naval vessels are constructed and equipped with
highly advanced technology, such as Aegis technology. Finally, Japan already possesses the
technology to build, support, and manage aircraft carriers; it deployed aircraft carriers over fifty
years ago during World War II.13
Japan is also constructing an advanced air force. Based on the technology of the U.S. F-
16C/D, Japan's "FSX" will be far superior to any aircraft that China can manufacture and it will be
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6at least as capable as any aircraft China can import from Russia or from anywhere else, but with
the important advantage of domestic production. It is also purchasing AWACS aircraft from the
United States. Thus, Japan possesses or is developing advanced conventional naval and air
capabilities based on weaponry and technology far superior to that which China possesses or can
look forward to developing during the next decade.'4
Finally, China is concerned by Japan's determination to develop a sophisticated nuclear
weapons program. Japan's interest in plutonium-based nuclear reactors and its advanced-
technology civilian rocket program indicate Japanese possession of advanced strategic nuclear
capability. One Chinese report observed Japanese stockpiling of plutonium and its acquisition of
uranium enrichment, commenting that the only use of such minerals and technology is in the
manufacture of nuclear weapons. It also observed that the capability of Tokyo's nuclear delivery
systems rank Japan third, behind only the United States and Russia.' 5 Tokyo has also been
developing the technology to construct advanced non-strategic missiles systems with various
ranges and deployments. "Spin-ons" of Japanese civilian technology to military uses is an
important source of potential Japanese strategic power.'6
This combination of Japanese economic resources and strategic potential creates
heightened Chinese concern for Japan's future regional role. In many respects, Japan has the
ability to "turn on a dime." Moreover, unlike policy makers in the United States and other
western countries, Chinese leaders give reduced weight to Japan's current reluctance to expand its
military role in world affairs. While acknowledging that domestic opinion in Japan continues to
restrain Tokyo's foreign policy options, Chinese leaders have a longer historical perspective on the
role of domestic politics and culture on Japanese foreign policy. Japanese occupation of China
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7during the 1930s and 1940s teaches that Japanese potential for domestic "militarism" can be as
influential as "pacifism" and that such "militarism" can lead to regional instability with serious
implications for Chinese security.
Thus, as Chinese leaders look out toward the twenty-first century, they must be concerned
about Japanese intentions. Indeed, not too long ago most of the research analysts in China's
Central Military Commission reportedly concluded that Japan will become a major military power
and, in the context of continued Soviet weakness, that it will target its strategy and capabilities
against China, "challenging China politically and militarily."'7 It is thus incumbent on Chinese
leaders to develop a foreign policy toward Japan that consolidates the foundation of Sino-
Japanese cooperation and that maximizes Tokyo's incentive to de-emphasize the military
instruments of diplomacy.
CONSOLIDATING COOPERATION:
In many respects, China can draw considerable confidence from the current status of Sino-
Japanese relations. For an historically troubled relationship and one that has considerable
potential for heightened tension and conflict, the two sides have developed foreign policies and a
bilateral relationship that suggests a long-term ability to manage and constrain the inevitable
competition that will develop between two great powers in close proximity that are
simultaneously developing expanded economic, political and military roles in East Asia -- their
common strategic backyard.
A crucial component of contemporary Sino-Japanese relations that helps reassure Chinese
8leaders of the prospects for long-term stability and contribute to Chinese ability to prepare for
instability is bilateral economic cooperation. Sino-Japanese economic relations can provide the
capital and technology required to modernize China's economy and defense capabilities. Equally
important, over the long-term it can provide powerful economic and social incentives for leaders
in both countries to maintain cooperation and to find peaceful solutions to bilateral conflicts. To
the extent that interest groups develop in Japan that benefit from Japanese participation in Chinese
economic development, they can encourage politicians to consider compromise solutions to
conflicts of interests. This dynamic is apparent in U.S.-China relations, in which U.S. business
interests have been instrumental in the annual efforts by the White House to maintain China's
MFN trading status. Economic cooperation can create a foundation for cooperative relations
which can exist amid developing political conflict.
Recent trends in Sino-Japanese economic relations are encouraging. Japan is China's
largest trading partner. In 1995, total merchandise trade increased to nearly U.S.$58 billion, a
nearly twenty-five per cent increase over 1994 and China's imports from Japan grew by over 17
per cent to nearly 22 U.S.$billion. Chinese exports to Japan play an important role in Beijing's
efforts to accumulate hard currency. Exports grew by 30 per cent to nearly U.S. 36 $billion,
yielding China a U.S.$ 14 billion trade surplus with Japan.'8 Although this trade surplus may
create friction with Japan, it is a manageable amount, especially insofar as Japan continues to run
an overall trade surplus.
China is also important export market for Japanese manufactured goods. In 1994, China
was Japan's fifth largest export market, significantly contributing to Japanese employment and
stable economic growth. 9 In the future, the Chinese consumer market should become
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9increasingly important for Japan, as Chinese economic development spreads beyond coastal cities
and major industrial centers, stimulating increased Chinese demand for high-end imported
consumer goods.
Especially important for the economic and political relationship is the trend in Japanese
investment in China. Through the 1980s and early 1990s, Japanese investors showed little interest
in China. Through 1989, Japan had provided only 8 per cent of the direct foreign investment in
China and only 1 percent of Japan total direct foreign investment and 6 per cent of its direct
foreign investment in Asia.20 The dearth of investment aroused suspicions in China over Japanese
attitudes toward China, particularly insofar as the minimal investment led to little technology
transfer.
This trend began a fundamental turn-around in 1992. Between March 1992 and March
1993, new Japanese investment in China increased by 87 per cent over the previous year and three
times that of 1989-90, while total Japanese overseas investment dropped by 18 per cent. By 1993
Japan had become the fourth largest investor in China, surpassing Germany.2 Sino-Japanese
investment relations took another positive turn in 1995. In the first six months of 1995, actual
Japanese capital input into China increased nearly 48 per cent over the same period in 1994.
More important, in 1995 large Japanese firms, including Matsushita, NEC and Toyota, began
investing in large-scale Chinese manufacturing projects involving high-technology industries.22
Japanese capital is now beginning to make a significant contribution to Chinese economic
development. Moreover, this trend has important implications for the Sino-Japanese political
relationship, creating a significant Japanese economic interest in stable political relations.
Finally, Japan's important loan program to China also contributes to Chinese economic
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development. Between 1979 and 1995, Japan's three yen loan packages for China amounted to
approximately 1.6 trillion yen. The interest rates for the loans has been a mere 2.3 per cent per
year and China has had 30 years to repay the loans, with an additional 10 years of"deferment."
In preliminary negotiations for the fourth loan package covering 1996-1998, Tokyo agreed to
loan Beijing an additional 580 billion yen to help in the construction of 40 projects, including such
important infrastructure projects as airports and water supply systems.23 In the aftermath of the
February 1996 earthquake in Yunnan province, Japan also offered China U.S.$300,000 in
emergency aid.24
Complimenting the positive developments in trade relations have been constructive
developments in political relations. In the aftermath of the June 1989 Tiananmen incident, Japan
was the advanced industrial country least inclined to allow ideological considerations to interfere
with bilateral ties. There was never any question that Japan would continue to grant yen loans to
China and that trade relations would continue uninterrupted. Since then, bilateral summitry has
been a common development in relations, including frequent trips back and forth by the each
country's prime minister and a historic visit to Beijing by the Japanese emperor. The dialogue in
these meetings has been free of the friction that so often characterizes meetings between U.S. and
Chinese diplomats, despite the existence of various Sino-Japanese conflicts of interest.
The absence of ideological conflict has allowed Japan to engage Chinese leaders in a
regular security dialogue. Since the two sides agreed to hold the meetings in 1993, they have held
three such meetings, the most recent in January 1996. Prior to the 1996 meeting, separate
meetings had been held between foreign ministry and defense department officials. In 1996,
Tokyo and Beijing held a joint session of diplomats and defense officials, including Chinese
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General Xiong Guankai. Annual, low-profile meetings such as these offer regular opportunities
for each side to express concerns about the other's defense and foreign policies, including trends
in their respective defense budgets.25 Bilateral dialogues can also be conducive to dealing with
specific issues. After tensions developed in January 1996, in early March the Japanese and
Chinese foreign ministers agreed to open bilateral talks over economic development of the waters
surrounding the disputed Diaoyutai/Senkaku islands.26
NEW DIRECTIONS IN SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS
The cooperative trends in Sino-Japanese relations has been developing since early stages
of the post-Mao period, when extensive economic, societal, and diplomatic contacts became
possible. More recently, however, Chinese leaders must contend with what they perceive to be
the emergence of a potential countervailing trend Japanese foreign policy. Recent trends in
Japanese security policy and in Japan's China policy have begun -to elicit growing concern in the
Chinese leadership.
One aspect of this trend concerns U.S.-Japan security cooperation. Chinese leaders
clearly understand that the U. S.-Japan security cooperation plays an important role in restraining
Japanese military development. But should they conclude that the post-Cold War U.S.-Japan
relationship is moving from maintaining the option for Tokyo and Washington of enhanced future
cooperation against an unidentified threat toward contemporary strategic cooperation against
China, Beijing would view U.S.-Japan security cooperation with considerable alarm.
Beginning in early March 1995, following the release of the 1995 U.S. Defense
12
Department report on the East Asia Strategic Initiative, China began to express doubts about the
direction of the U.S.-Japan relationship. Among the various aspects of the Pentagon report that
aroused concern in Beijing was U.S. interest in strengthening U.S.-Japan strategic cooperation
and American interest in bolstering specific Japanese defense capabilities. They expressed concern
that in the post-Cold War era, now that the Soviet threat had ended, America now sought
expanded strategic cooperation with Japan. Chinese wondered whether this new direction in
U.S.-Japan relations was in response to the "China threat" and that it was aimed at "containing"
China.27 Then, in February 1996, in preparation for President Clinton's April visit to Tokyo,
White House officials reportedly sought inclusion in a joint U.S.-Japan statement on security a
reference to Chinese military modernization.
This trend culminated in April 1996, when President Bill Clinton traveled to Tokyo for a
U.S.-Japan summit and signed the U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security and reached
agreement on Principles for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation. The agreements called for greater
Japanese military responsibility in the alliance, including for the first time responsibility in joint
defense operations throughout Asia, suggesting to Chinese leaders that the alliance could promote
rather than inhibit Japanese defense build-up and be used against China. Chinese media argued
that the agreement was a "dangerous signal" that Japan has been "brought into U.S. global
strategy" and that it will "strengthen coordination with the actions of U.S. troops" in Asia. It
"gives the feeling" that the two countries "work hand-in-hand to dominate the Asia-Pacific
region."29 It also argued that the expansion of Japanese military activities "is bound to evoke the
vigilance...against Japan's advance toward becoming a military power. "In the long run, there is
no doubt that the aim is to keep a close watch on China....""
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Coinciding with the initiative in U.S. policy toward Japan has been a corresponding
Japanese interest in bolstering its relationship with the United States in response to development
in Chinese power. Although concern for the Chinese military is not as great in Japan as in the
United States, Chinese economic and defense modernization has elicited increased Japanese
attention. Chinese military maneuvers during the 1996 Taiwan strait crisis elicited increased
Japanese attention to Chinese capabilities and led many Japanese to question the wisdom of
reducing the U.S. military presence on Japan.31
Coinciding with these developments is the prospect for U.S.-Japan strategic cooperation
against Chinese security interests. In February 1996, Tokyo and Washington agreed to conduct a
study on the theater missile defense (TMD). Japanese sources also report that the United States,
to heighten Japanese security concerns and encourage Japanese interest in cooperation with
Washington on TMD, has shared with Tokyo strategic intelligence on China's nuclear capability.32
Chinese have argued that an East Asian TMD would be "clearly aimed at China." Should it be
deployed, its primary effect will be to "render ineffective" China's limited second-strike nuclear
capability, significantly enhancing Chinese vulnerability to U.S. military power and to potential
Japanese nuclear capability. Chinese concern for the strategic consequences of TMD in East Asia
have led Beijing to issue a warning that it would reconsider it commitment to participating in a
comprehensive test-ban treaty should such a system be deployed.33
China still sees considerable positive elements in U.S.-Japan cooperation. It is not
opposed to the U.S.-Japan alliance or to the U.S. military presence in Japan. It has not concluded
that the alliance is a net detriment for Chinese interests. On the contrary, Beijing still considers
U.S. security ties with Japan a contribution to both Chinese security and regional stability, if only
14
because the alternative -- an independent Japan providing for its own defense -- remains a far
more daunting prospect. There is now simply greater Chinese ambivalence toward U.S.-Japan
relations and uncertainty concerning the outcome of the new trend in security ties.
The second disconcerting element in Japanese foreign policy is the new trend in Japan's
China policy and the politics of policy making in Japan. Similar to the new dynamic in U.S. policy
making, the demise of the Soviet Union reduced Tokyo's concern for Sino-Japanese strategic
cooperation and opened the domestic debate in Japan over China policy. But perhaps even more
important was the end of Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) domination of Japanese politics in early
1994. Chinese leaders were not pleased with the emergence of true two-party politics in Japan.
Needless to say, Chinese communists are simply more comfortable dealing with one-party
governments. But more important, Beijing was apprehensive over the impact of enhanced
electoral competition on Japanese foreign policy. Chinese expressed concern that Japanese
politicians would have to appeal to mass sentiment to win votes and that domestic politics would
play a increasingly significant role in Japanese policy making.34
Since that time, Tokyo's China policy has elicited increased public debate, constraining the
flexibility of Japanese policy makers. Of greatest concern to China is the development in Japan of
a "Taiwan lobby." In mid 1995, after Lee Teng-hui visited Cornell University in the United
States, the Japanese government came under domestic pressure to allow the Taiwan leader to visit
Japan. Japanese opposition politicians pressed for the government to grant Lee a visa to visit
Kyoto University, his undergraduate institution, or to invite him or Taiwan Vice Premier Hsu
Lee-teh to attend the November 1995 APEC summit in Osaka. China warned that any such visits
would place the relationship "in the greatest danger" and Chinese President Jiang Zemin promised
____ ____I_________·*_I___
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to boycott the APEC meeting should either Taiwan leader attend the meeting.35 Ultimately, Japan
succumbed to Chinese pressure and Taiwan was represented in Osaka by Ku Chen-fu, head of
Taiwan's Straits Exchange Foundation.
Nonetheless, the trend in Japanese politics was clear. Throughout 1995, politicians from
various political parties in Japan were calling for enhanced Japanese-Taiwan diplomatic contacts.
In response, Beijing criticized "pro-Taiwan forces" and warned the Japanese government to
oppose any pro-Taiwan activities in Japan. When it seemed that a Japanese cabinet member
might participate in a pro-Taiwan demonstration, Beijing made "solemn representations" with the
Japanese Foreign Ministry.36
Then, during the 1996 Taiwan strait crisis, hard-line members of the Liberal Democratic
Party, reacting to China's military maneuvers, demanded that the Japanese government freeze its
yen loans to China. In response to the political pressure, the government was compelled to
postpone its talks with Beijing over the third round of Japanese yen loans. Japanese Foreign
Minister Yukihiko Ikeda advised Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen that in reaction to
Chinese nuclear testing and its Taiwan policy voices in Japan have called for a review of loan
program. The Japanese Foreign Ministry has been accused of being "weak-kneed" toward
China.37 When asked about the prospect that Japan might freeze the loans, China's foreign
ministry spokesman responded that China "would like to send a very clear and unmistakable
message to the Japanese side, which is that the issue of Taiwan is purely an internal matter of
China which brooks no foreign intervention or interference of any kind."38 The "Taiwan issue" is
now embedded in Japanese politics, adding an important element of uncertainty to Sino-Japanese
relations.
_
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Japanese domestic politics have affected other aspects of Japan's China policy. Japan's
response to China's nuclear testing program has elicited PRC concern. Faced with domestic
opposition to Japanese acquiescence to Chinese testing, in September 1995 the Japanese
government froze its grant aid to China. Although the amount of the aid was relatively nominal
and the PRC issued a low-key reaction, Chinese commentary pointed to domestic forces in Japan
that opposed Chinese modernization and Sino-Japanese cooperation and expressed concern for
the prospects for the relationship.3 9
The recent tension between Japan and South Korea and Japan and China over disputed
islands may also reflect the influence of Japanese domestic politics. In conjunction with its
ratification of the Law of the Sea, the Japanese government is under pressure to formally establish
a 200-mile economic zone around all Japanese territory. The prospect of such legislation has led
to demonstrations throughout South Korea and tension in South-Korean-Japanese relations.
Beijing's apparent response to Japanese intentions was to send vessels to carry out short-term
trial oil drills in the vicinity of the Diaoyutai islands. In so doing, Beijing likely meant to reassert
its claims to the islands while, more quietly than South Korea, warning Japan to avoid placing the
dispute high on the bilateral agenda.40
Japan's changing domestic environment will continue contribute to Chinese apprehension
and uncertainty over the Japanese foreign policy. Although Chinese leaders believe that Japanese
policy makers and leading politicians continue to place importance on Sino-Japanese relations and
wish to maintain cooperation with China, they also understand that Japanese domestic political
instability is a potential source of policy change, insofar as Japanese policy makers could allow
political considerations to determine policy. The Taiwan issue, economic relations and other
_11 
____l___ii_______I ____l___l___nl__aP_
17
bilateral problems issues could become hostage to Japanese partisan politics.4'
The combination of Japan's changing strategic relationship with the United States and the
politicization of China policy in Japanese domestic politics creates an important element of
uncertainty in China concerning the fture of Japanese foreign policy, its implications for Chinese
security, and for the course of Sino-Japanese relations. How Chinese foreign policy responds to
these new challenges to Sino-Japanese relations will be critical in determining the course of the
relationship and the politics of East Asia.
MANAGING A CHANGING RELATIONSHIP:
China's impact on Japan China policy falls into three categories. The first is Beijing's
strategic response to Japanese capabilities and the trend in the bilateral balance of power. The
second is Beijing's response to immediate issues in the bilateral relationship and to emerging
trends in Japan's China policy. The third category comprises those Chinese policies not
necessarily aimed at Japan but which impact Japan's China policy, including policy toward third
parties. In each case, the implications of Chinese policy for bilateral relations and Chinese policy
alternatives need to be addressed.
China's most fundamental and long-term policy response to the Japanese challenge is
economic modernization and, specifically, defense modernization. Beijing cannot but look at
Japan's technological and military superiority over China and the prospect that the gap might
actually widen before its begins to narrow with considerable apprehension. From this perspective,
Chinese leaders express their true intention when they insist that China need a peaceful
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international environment in which to modernize its economy and develop the foundation of
comprehensive national strength.42 The longer China can focus its scarce domestic resources on
economic modernization, the more secure it will be if and when heightened tension returns to East
Asian politics.
But while laying the economic foundation for national security, Chinese leaders have also
decided they must begin the process of military modernization. To wait to acquire modern
weaponry and to reduce China's strategic vulnerability until the security situation requires it
would ensure Chinese strategic inferiority when the weaponry is needed most. This is as true for
nuclear weaponry as it is for conventional weaponry, insofar as the long-term survival of China' s
second-strike capability is in doubt. Ding Henggao made this point when explaining why China
needs to modernize its defense capability:
The grim reality is that in a world characterized by turbulent international
politics and fierce competition in military high-tech, a nation that fails to work hard
to raise its level of defense S&T and upgrade its defense capability...would find
itself in a vulnerable position once war breaks out, with devastating effects on its
national interests, national dignity, and international prestige.43
What most concerned Ding was the long way that China's defense capabilities had to go in order
to meet world standards:
China's defense S&T has come a long way but still trails the best in the world. To
master modern technology, especially to meet the demands of high-tech war, we
must overcome many hurdles, including the shortage of funds, technology, and
qualified personnel....the situation...compels us to work hard for several years to
bring our defense S&T and weaponry to a level to meet the needs of future high-
tech war.44
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It is this strategic imperative that drives China's increasing defense budget, purchases of
foreign weaponry, including advanced Russian aircraft and naval vessels, and nuclear testing.
Japan, as much as any other country, could become China's strategic rival, posing a daunting
defense agenda for China's PLA. But China's strategic response to vulnerability also contributes
to Sino-Japanese friction, insofar as it elicits Japanese fears of a "China threat," and the prospect
of transformed Japanese intentions, leading Japan to adopt those very policies that China is trying
to prevent. Embedded in China's response to the imbalance in the Sino-Japanese balance is the
potential for a self-fulfilling prophesy.
It is not clear how China's defense policy can ameliorate this dilemma. China's 1996 calls
for a modest (when adjusted for the inflation rate) 10 per cent increase in defense spending.45
Nevertheless, as long as China's absolute defense budget continues to increase by double-digit
figures and the PLA seeks foreign weaponry to correct its strategic vulnerability, the PRC's
defense modernization efforts will attract attention in Japan. This puts the burden of maintaining
stable Sino-Japanese relations and Japanese confidence in Chinese intentions on Chinese
diplomacy. It requires that Chinese leaders manage Sino-Japanese conflicts of interest with
sufficient subtlety both to protect Chinese interests and not elicit Japanese apprehension.
China's response to the recent developments in Japanese foreign policy and China policy
has been to place increased pressure on Japan to reconsider its policy priorities. Much of this
pressure is reflected in greater Chinese media attention to the potential for renewed "militarism"
in Japan and to worrisome developments in Japanese foreign policy. In the aftermath of the June
4 tragedy, Chinese scholars and journalists were instructed not to write negative reports about
Japan.46 In 1995, that restriction was lifted and the Chinese media began an active campaign
_
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against a wide range of Japanese behavior. Most prominent was Chinese media coverage of the
50th anniversary of the end of World War II, which relentlessly attacked the atrocities of the
Japanese occupation of China and ominously warned of the potential for revived militarism in
contemporary Japan. But perhaps more important was Chinese coverage of Japanese military
capabilities. Until 1995, with the exception of commentary on the size of the defense budget,
there was clear restriction against any coverage of Japanese defense policy. In 1995, for the first
time, Chinese analysts discussed Japanese military capabilities and its advanced weaponry,
including its nuclear program. In so doing, China was not only signaling Japan its concern for
trends in Japanese defense policy, but also the risk of heightened Sino-Japanese tension resulting
from "China threat" charges and corresponding changes in Japanese defense policy. One Chinese
report observed trends in Japanese defense policy and warned that the "situation in Japan is
somewhat similar to that in pre-war Japan. What road will Japan take? - this question definitely
cannot be ignored."47
Chinese use of the media is a convenient and low-profile approach to general trends in
Japanese foreign policy. More difficult for Chinese diplomats to manage are specific Japanese
policy initiatives. One such issue is the territorial dispute in Sino-Japanese relations. The
Diaoyutai/Senkaku dispute has existed since 1949, yet both countries have preferred to keep the
issue off of the bilateral agenda. Ideally, China would ignore form and focus on substance
regarding the dispute. Or simply respond with similar legislation, which it will likely do in 1996.
Yet sensitivity to sovereignty issues seems to combined with succession politics to compel a more
active Chinese response. Thus, Beijing dispatched a drilling vessel to the disputed waters. Using
its media, it also quietly sided with South Korea in its conflict with Japan over the disputed island
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of Tokto/Take, thus urging caution on Japanese handling of the Sino-Japanese dispute.48
Nonetheless, these were low-key responses. They did not involve either military vessels or public
recriminations requiring a Japanese response. Moreover, because Japan has minimal interest in
developing the waters around the disputed islands, this should remain a manageable issue.49
Another issue requiring a Chinese response is Japan's increasing desire to gain a
permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. It is clear that China is opposed to
Japanese permanent membership on the committee. China clearly prefers the current situation, in
which it has the advantage over Japan regarding Security Council deliberations over regional
issues. Moreover, Beijing cannot look forward to the prospect of U.S.-Japan cooperation in the
security council. Thus, Chinese frequently assert that it is not yet appropriate to consider
Japanese permanent membership on the Security Council. One discussion of U.N. Security
Council reform went so far as to assert that "it is absolutely impermissible to grant the veto to
newly admitted permanent members."50
The PRC should be able to manage this issue, as well. China has not drawn any lines in
the sand and there remains a wide-ranging and inconclusive debate on U.N. reform, suggesting
that the issue may linger for awhile and that Beijing will not have to take the lead in resisting far-
reaching reform. Equally important, should an international consensus emerge that Japan should
have permanent member status with the veto, Beijing would most likely not stand in the way.
Similarly, China appears to have acquiesced to growing Japanese participation in United Nations
peacekeeping activities, despite the implications for Japanese receptivity to the use of military
instruments in diplomacy.5
Chinese leaders seem intent on preventing bilateral issues from disrupting Sino-Japanese
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cooperation. Although China continues to modernize the PLA, refuses to move off of long-held
positions, such as sovereignty over disputed territories and Japanese membership on the U.N.
Security Council, and warns of the consequences of revived Japanese "militarism," it has
maintained a low-profile on Sino-Japanese disputes. There is evidence that China understands the
risks entailed in an overly contentious Japan policy. But what is less clear is whether China can
manage the consequences for Sino-Japanese relations of third party issues and non-foreign policy
issues.
The factors affecting Japan's China policy are not limited to Chinese policy toward Japan
and Chinese defense policy. China's mere size and proximity to Japan ensures that various
aspects of Chinese politics and foreign policy will be contentious issues in Japanese politics and
that Japanese policy making will reflect the political considerations of Japanese leaders contending
for power in an uncertain electoral environment. Moreover, many of these issues are not readily
amenable to Chinese diplomatic management.
China's human rights policies could destabilize Sino-Japanese relations. Renewed violent
repression of dissent in China in the post-Deng period or even simply excessive authoritarian
policies in Hong Kong after 1997 would likely elicit far greater public outcry and political and
policy repercussions in Japan than did the June 4 tragedy. The Japanese public is increasingly
disinclined to be tolerant of Chinese human rights violations and Japanese politicians are
increasingly disinclined to ignore voter sentiment in policy making.
Chinese conflict with third parties will also affect Japanese attitudes toward China.
Taiwan's foreign policy and U.S. policy toward Taiwan, themselves susceptible to recurring
domestic instability in all three parties, may well determine the trend in cross-strait relations,
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eliciting additional mainland-Taiwan crises which could undermine support in Japan for
cooperative relations with China and for restraint in Japanese defense policy. Insofar as Taiwan is
the mainland's most important foreign policy issue, it will be difficult for Chinese leaders to
moderate policy toward Taiwan to maintain cooperative relations with Japan. Should U.S.-China
relations deteriorate, due to heightened conflict over any of the numerous conflicts of interest in
U.S.-China relations, Japan will come under increased pressure to cooperate with U.S. policy and
to contribute to American efforts to "contain" China. Yet, U.S.-China relations are equally
unpredictable and potentially unmanageable, influenced as much by American domestic politics,
third party issues, and U.S. policy on a wide range of bilateral conflicts of interests as by Chinese
behavior. Equally troublesome for Sino-Japanese relations could be conflict between China and
the other claimants to the disputed Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. Insofar as heightened
conflict would suggest Chinese expansionism along the shipping lanes to Persian Gulf oil, support
would likely grow in Japan for greater strategic cooperation with the United States.
On the other hand, enhanced cooperation between China and third parties, which China
does have considerable ability to control, could also influence Sino-Japanese relations. Of
particular importance is Sino-Russian relations. The combination of potential Sino-Japanese
conflict with ongoing Japanese-Russian rancor over the Northern Territories and lack of
economic cooperation prepares Japan to see "collusion" in Sino-Russian relations. In this respect,
Beijing must be sensitive to the affect of growing cooperation between China and Russia,
including Russian arms sales to China and close ties between the civilian and military leaderships,
on Japanese policy making. Although less strategically prominent and of less immediate
importance, Sino-South Korean cooperation has a similar potential to arouse anxiety in Japan.
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China and South Korea share distrust of Japanese "militarism" and for the trend in Japanese
defense procurement policies. Beijing's decision to subtlety side with Seoul in its territorial
dispute with Tokyo suggests that Beijing is aware of Japanese concern and that it is willing to
insinuate greater Chinese-South Korean cooperation to pressure Japan to consider Chinese
interests. Yet incautious Chinese cooperation with South Korea could spur Japan to adopt
strategic measures detrimental to Chinese security and Sino-Japanese cooperation. China can
draw comfort from its cooperative political relationships with Russia and South Korea, but it must
manage these relationships so as not to harm its equally important interest in Sino-Japanese
cooperation.
The danger in all of these potential developments is that Chinese policy on domestic or
third party issues could elicit the very Japanese foreign policy that Beijing's bilateral Japan policy
attempts to forestall. Yet policy making on all of these issues has its own domestic and bilateral
dynamic and it requires policy-making sophistication and domestic political confidence to consider
the multitude of cross-cutting interests involved in "grand strategy" when making policy on such
intrinsically important and politically sensitive issues as Taiwan, Hong Kong, human rights,
Spratly Islands, U.S.-China relations and Sino-Russian relations. Moreover, many of these issues,
such as the Taiwan issue and repressing domestic dissent, entail interests which Chinese leaders
consider more important than stable bilateral relations with Japan and which entail and a mixture
of sovereignty and succession politics, thus reducing Beijing's incentive to consider the
implications for Sino-Japanese relations of policy toward these interests. But whether Beijing is
simply reacting or taking the initiative, its policy on any of external issues could derail Sino-
Japanese cooperation.
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CONCLUSION:
Chinese management of its Japan policy is not only crucial to vital Chinese interests but
also to regional stability. Japan has the potential both to contribute to Chinese economic
modernization and security and to develop and use region-wide military, political and economic
instruments to retard Chinese economic development and to undermine Chinese security.
Heightened Sino-Japanese cooperation can underpin regional stability and economic cooperation,
but heightened conflict has the potential to polarize all of East Asia into competing blocs,
undermining the region's ability to continue its successful pursuit of economic growth and the
development of regional stability with multilateral institutions of cooperation. Much is riding on
Chinese policy and the course of Sino-Japanese relations.
To protect Chinese security and maintain Sino-Japanese cooperation, Beijing must weave
together a wide range of potentially contradictory policies. Its defense policy is a necessary hedge
against the possibility of deteriorated relations with a superior economic, technological and even
military power. But China's defense budget and its acquisition of advanced foreign weaponry has
potential to elicit Japanese policy detrimental to Chinese interests. The burden rests on Beijing's
bilateral Japan policy to have a countervailing impact on bilateral relations. But Sino-Japanese
relations have become increasingly complex. The end of the Cold War and the decline of LDP
dominance in domestic politics have undermined Tokyo's ability to take the long-view of Sino-
Japanese relations and to continue to shelve what had been secondary conflicts of interest. The
resulting new points of friction as well as enhanced U.S.-Japan strategic cooperation have
complicated bilateral relations and added an element of doubt to Chinese confidence in Sino-
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Japanese cooperation.
Complications in Sino-Japanese relations have elicited a more outspoken Chinese policy
toward Japan. The Chinese media is once again covering trends considered counterproductive to
Beijing, including alleged revival of militarism and Japanese defense spending, and it has been
critical of elements of Japanese policy toward China, including Tokyo's relationship with Taiwan,
its handling of the yen loan program, and its policy on disputed territories. Nonetheless, Beijing
continues to evaluate favorably the trend in Japanese foreign policy and its Japan policy reflects
this. It has maintained a low-key approach to conflicts of interests, trying to caution Japan from
adopting contentious policies, while trying to maintain cooperative relations. Its bilateral Japan
policy reflects the cross-cutting pressures that Japan poses to Chinese interests.
If Sino-Japanese relations existed in vacuum, relations would be relatively easy to manage.
But there exists of wide range of external factors that could affect Japanese policy making and
redirect the relationship, ranging from Chinese treatment of dissidents and the Taiwan issue to
U.S.-China and Sino-Russian relations, despite Chinese intentions to maintain stable relations.
China's control over the course of these issues is at times minimal. At other times, leadership
incentive and/or ability to incorporate China's interest in stable Sino-Japanese relations into policy
making is minimal. And affecting the entire spectrum of issues is the fact that Japan is a
democracy and Chinese leaders are celebrated for their inability to consider the implications of
their own behavior for the politics of China policy in democracies.
Sino-Japanese relations do not exist in a vacuum. Chinese leaders will have to exercise
considerable tolerance, patience, and sophistication to maintain cooperative relations with Japan
in increasingly complex circumstances. Thus far, they have shown the ability to develop a Japan
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policy which responds to the numerous challenges to Chinese interests. Nonetheless, given the
that the challenges will likely grow and relations with Japan will likely become more complex,
China's Japan policy and Sino-Japanese relations must be considered one more factor contributing
to the uncertainty of Asia after the Cold War.
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